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PERFORMATIVE REGULATION 
 
A Case Study in How Powerful People Avoid Criminal Labels 
 
Simon Mackenzie and Penny Green* 
 
 
This paper explores the role of invested powerful business actors in the 
criminalisation process as applied to the illicit antiquities market. We present a case 
study of the precise mechanics of the role played by trade interests in the formation of 
the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003. This process involved the 
trade’s entering appearance in the legislative process and neutralising the possible 
constraining effects on its members of the new criminal offence which was to be 
created. We begin by exploring the political, historical and economic context in which 
discussion of the terms of the 2003 Act first began. We then follow the Act from its 
genesis through its various stages of drafting and re-drafting, to its enactment. This 
case study of a single piece of legislation provides further data to add to the line of 
prior research that illustrates that powerful white-collar criminals, as well as 
sometimes preventing criminal legislation entering the statute books, can also 
influence the design of criminal legislation that does enter the statute books in order 
to protect themselves and their own business interests. We also use this case study of 
a process of contemporary law-making to outline the concept of performative 
regulation: broadly, that which in appearance serves political ends but in practice 
effects an inconsequential level of control.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This paper explores the role of invested powerful business actors in the 
criminalisation process as applied to the illicit antiquities market. One of the 
antiquities dealers in our sample of this group of powerful and influential traders, 
keen to affirm his role as model law-abiding citizen, sums up his approach to the 
regulation of dealing in illicit antiquities in terms of passive reception (McBarnet 
2003); he states his position as: ‘If you make it illegal, I’ll stop doing it’. What he 
fails to mention is that legislation has in fact been passed in his jurisdiction in relation 
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to dealing in looted antiquities to ‘make it illegal’; that this legislation contains such a 
watered-down version of the offence it was conceived to tackle that while ‘it’ is 
illegal in spirit it remains effectively unprosecutable in practice; and that he was one 
of the leading figures instrumental in knocking the teeth out of this legislation as it 
was drafted. It is this process of influence on the legislative process we shall detail 
here. 
 
In this paper we use a case study of a piece of antiquities legislation to draw together 
and empirically illustrate four key theoretical propositions pertinent to white-collar 
crime. These are first, that as well as ‘first and second dimensional’ power (in crude 
sum, the former being obvious force and the latter agenda-setting which pushes 
unpalatable prospects off the menu of possible regulatory decisions – both of which 
are, as we shall see, evident in our data) a highly effective form of power operates 
through ‘third dimensional’ activities which through influence on preference-
formation encourage the apparently voluntary delivery of pleasing results to the 
exercisers of this power by those they so dominate (Lukes 2005). Second, our data 
supports a view of regulation as a facilitative instrument for the powerful. This is a 
counter-intuitive theoretical position that sees regulation as in some senses part of the 
constitutive context for wrongdoing. Regulation, controlled or affected by powerful 
interests, marks out certain activities as illegal but at the same time legitimates those 
areas outside the immediate boundary of its concern (Cain and Hunt 1979; McBarnet 
1992). Third, we offer a view that the reality behind the veneer of democratic law-
making, which might be thought to involve reasoned argumentation about the merits 
of any proposed law, often manifests in a less principled, strategic battle of personal 
interest which disguises itself in the language of democratic debate and professional 
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politics. This brings the sociological study of the legislative process directly into line 
with classic studies which have found similar micro-processes of interpersonal 
interaction providing the empirical foundation for the seemingly still waters of 
professional practices and routines in other institutions such as the academy 
(Bourdieu 1988), and laboratory science (Latour and Woolgar 1979). Certain 
processes of law-making emerge as particularly susceptible in their design to this 
form of influence: here we expose the inherent failures of a particular legislative 
mechanism, the Private Member’s Bill, as a robust mode of creation of legal controls. 
Fourth, we offer a view of regulation as performativity: contemporary regulation, we 
argue, is not typified by level-headed calculation of principled legal-structural 
foundation designed to stand the test of time. Rather, regulation as it currently plays 
out empirically often operates a ‘fire-fighting’ model of panicked response to pressing 
crisis, led in its ethos not by problem-solving on the long view but by a political 
desire ‘to be seen to be doing something’. The manufacture of regulation in this way 
opens particular opportunities for the exertion of influence by powerful interest 
groups over the content of the law, thus providing scope for the instrumental 
operation of ‘law as a means to an end’ for powerful groups, rather than an 
embodiment of aspirations towards the public good (Tamanaha 2006).        
 
We have elsewhere attempted to unravel the power relations of the antiquities market, 
with a particular emphasis on the ‘powerful’ image and actions of dealers in the 
market and the ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Becker 1963) who rail against their trade 
(Mackenzie and Green forthcoming). We attributed the power of the dealers to 
various cultural, historical, economic and perceptual factors. They are ‘elite’ in terms 
of personal financial wealth and the esteem which is associated with the cultural 
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capital of their profession. However, the antiquities trade in London does not 
seriously prop up the domestic economy by any measure – the value of the licit trade 
in classical antiquities in the UK was estimated at £15 million in 1999 (Palmer et al. 
2000: 41) – nor are antiquities dealers employers of significant numbers of local 
workers. They are powerful therefore not in the brute sense of corporate financial 
muscle which might allow the prospect of political weight attaching to the relocation 
of the market abroad should regulation tighten up at home. Rather they are powerful 
in terms of personal economic and social capital – they have, or can buy, powerful 
connections – and in terms of the deference which is accorded to their traditional 
social role as preservers and displayers of culture.  
 
It is precisely attacks on this historical elite status which dealers have reported pains 
them most about their current predicament. Many have profited handsomely from 
their career activities and have enough money to retire quite comfortably should their 
profession be banned entirely; it is not their financial future which worries them, but 
the ignominy of the fall from grace of their previously highly respected practices, now 
increasingly tainted with the vulgarity of accusations of dealing in stolen property. 
There is considerable empirical support for such accusations, however, and it is on 
this basis that we come to consider antiquities dealers as white-collar criminals. 
Previous research has shown both that they sometimes knowingly break export and 
handling laws, and that they also indulge in a form of creative compliance with these 
laws (McBarnet 2003, 2006) which involves deliberately not allowing themselves to 
be put in positions of knowledge about the origin of objects that would then render a 
purchase unlawful (Mackenzie 2005a, b, 2006).       
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It was noted in our other output that dealers’ ‘systemic power’ included the capacity 
at crisis points to act in effective targeted ways to defend the future of the trade from 
regulatory constraint (Mackenzie and Green forthcoming). In this paper we present a 
case study of the precise mechanics of this process insofar as it related to the trade’s 
entering appearance in the legislative process and neutralising the possible 
constraining effects on its members of a new criminal offence which was to be 
created.  
 
The story which is told in the history of this legislation is populated by three key 
groups of ‘players’. These can be summed up as ‘trade’, ‘activist’ and ‘political’ 
interests. The trade group consists of business people and organisations who buy and 
sell antiquities (dealers, auction houses) and their lobbyists, lawyers, and other 
representatives or sympathisers. The activists argue against the illicit trade, and often 
include the apparently legitimate trade in their critique. Many contend that the whole 
trade in antiquities is more or less complicit in the looting of objects from source 
countries, and recent empirical studies have provided data supporting these 
allegations (Mackenzie 2005b; Kersel 2006). The activists tend to be archaeologists, 
although there are also several international organisations concerned with the 
protection of cultural heritage, such as UNESCO and SAFE, which embody a 
somewhat diffuse level of activism in relation to the issue. Finally, the regulatory 
process described here is influenced by political interests: in our case these are the 
executive powers of the Department for Culture Media and Sport, the Ministerial 
powers of the Department’s temporary figureheads, a Private Member of the House of 
Commons, an All Party interest group consisting of members of both Houses, and 
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members of the House of Lords who have influenced the legislation with speeches 
and manoeuvres based on their personal allegiances in the debate.  
 
These three groups are not mutually exclusive. Our comment above on the Lords 
illustrates that some key political actors can also be members of the ‘trade’ and 
‘activist’ groups, and museums occupy an interestingly ambiguous role sitting both as 
participants in the trade and as employers of various curators who are relatively 
activist. It is hard to categorise museums as a whole in the debate, but a brief and 
relatively accurate way to do so is to say that UK museums are considerably less pro-
market than many in the US, and that within the UK a few resolutely pro-market 
institutions are the exception to the general appearance of a more balanced and 
reticent involvement in the looting issues affecting the trade.  
 
The story that emerges is one of conflict-within-consensus. Here, an apparent process 
of mutual compromise and agreement in law-making between political, activist and 
trade interests structures and contains the pursuit of self-interest by the political and 
trade representatives, and exercises of power which obstruct the aims of the activists. 
It should be apparent already that our investigations at the micro-political level of 
legislative process reveal the inappropriate lack of detail provided in standard 
unreflective language of ‘regulators’ and ‘regulated’. In the process we describe the 
trade is an active agent in its own regulation (thus both regulator and regulated), the 
activists are also included in the regulatory role, and the government, whom we might 
hitherto have assumed to be the major occupant of the regulator’s chair, provides the 
infrastructure (the establishment of committees, drafting assistance in emerging 
private legislation) within which the decision-making processes of law occur but 
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doesn’t in fact emerge as having done much ‘regulating’ at all, in the conventional 
sense of the word.     
 
Through this case study of a single piece of legislation, we illustrate that white-collar 
criminals, as well as sometimes preventing criminal legislation entering the statute 
books, can also influence the design of criminal legislation that does enter the statute 
books in order to protect themselves and their own business interests. This is pre-
legislative intervention: the legitimised manipulation and neutralisation by white-
collar marketeers of laws directed at them. 
  
Our illustration of market influence on the terms and content of legislation can be 
seen as the latest addition to a significant body of work which documents and 
analyses how elite interests can influence the formulation of laws to dilute or subvert  
regulatory attempts to control harmful corporate or white-collar activity (for useful 
introductions to which, see Passas and Goodwin 2004; Passas 2005). This form of 
corporate regulatory influence is perhaps nowhere clearer than in the history of the 
US automotive industry’s attempts to subvert and delay the introduction of minimum 
auto safety standards, or in the asbestos industry’s persistent campaign to thwart and 
delay the introduction of health and safety legislation throughout the twentieth 
century. In the case of the automotive industry, as with the antiquities market, the 
government and the law ‘afforded greater constitutional protection to …profit 
maximization’ than it did to the protective role of the state (Lee 1998: 390). When the 
US government belatedly began to take motor vehicle safety seriously the courts 
afforded the industry the right to object to every new safety standard proposed by the 
government’s National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA). In 
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effect this resulted in motor vehicle manufacturing companies consciously employing 
delay tactics, challenging single sections of every standard one at a time. With each 
challenge the NHTSA was obligated to conduct research and demonstrate ‘an 
objective safety benefit’ arising from the proposed standard.  According to Lee 
‘…manufacturers were able to use the ‘rule of reasonableness’…to consistently stall 
the regulatory process’ (Lee 1998: 398-99). This process naturally resulted in 
seriously delayed but also weakened safety standards. Asbestos corporations such as 
Turner and Newell and Manville Johns employed similar strategies to control 
attempts to regulate that industry’s harmful impact on workers. In fact following years 
of consciously attempting to reduce public awareness and embarking on its own 
results-driven research (to challenge the scientific evidence which had emerged 
directly linking asbestos to lung disease), Manville became involved as the principal 
drafter of federal legislation designed to establish a national compensation fund for 
victims of asbestos-induced disease (Calhoun and Hiller 1988). Both examples 
demonstrate not only the power of an occupational or industrial elite to limit the scope 
of regulatory regimes directed against their business activities but also reveal the easy 
access afforded these elites to processes of political and legislative decision-making. 
The parallels with the antiquities market will become apparent.  
 
The Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003 (‘the 2003 Act’) began as an 
attempt to tighten up the criminal law regarding the purchase in the UK of pieces of 
ancient art inter alia stolen overseas. We begin by exploring the political, historical 
and economic context in which discussion of the terms of the 2003 Act first began. 
We then follow the Act from its genesis through its various stages of drafting and re-
drafting, to its enactment and coming into force on 31 December 2003. We conclude 
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with a discussion of the implications of this case study for conflict theories of 
regulation, and suggest a contemporary analysis of the role of political short-termism 
and insubstantial engagement with social issues that sees processes of regulation such 
as those leading to the 2003 Act as ‘performative’. At the time of writing, four years 
after it came into force, there have been no convictions under the Act.  
 
Where did the 2003 Act come from? 
 
Braithwaite has noted that the criminalisation of certain forms of action can be seen to 
be representative of the development of wider social norms with regard to appropriate  
behaviour, illustrated by the relatively recent entry onto the books of new crimes 
concerning activities such as drink-driving, domestic violence and an increasing 
number of strict liability offences in the realm of workplace safety and pollution 
(Braithwaite 1995). Consciousness-raising in respect of ‘new’ forms of harmful 
activity begins with the work of pressure groups which fit the definition of ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ (Becker 1963). These groups encourage social and political scrutiny of 
harmful action, leading first to the social re-definition as morally unacceptable of an 
act previously thought normal, and then perhaps to its criminalisation. This process of 
consciousness-raising has occurred in relation to the criminalisation in 2003 of the 
market in looted antiquities in the UK. In the case of looted antiquities the moral 
entrepreneurs who have challenged market notions of the acceptable trade in 
antiquities are a small but politically active group of archaeologists whom we have 
called activists. Their campaign has been both normative and regulatory and in 
essence revolves around a desire to reframe the antiquities market as an unethical 
industry founded on looting and theft.  
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This smooth vision of the process of social change conceals continuing resistance. 
Although criminal legislation has entered the books in respect of what parliament 
agreed was a criminally undesirable form of action, business interests implicated in 
the performance of that action have managed to ensure that they remain effectively 
exempt from prosecution. According to Vernon Rapley, head of the Art and 
Antiquities Unit of the Metropolitan Police:  
 
We’ve estimated that we may pursue one charge under the new Act every five 
years. That’s a view that was supported by CPS opinion at the time.  
 
The work of the moral entrepreneurs in this case has been subverted by capitalist 
entrepreneurs. How did this happen?      
 
On 24 May 2000 the then Minister for the Arts, the Rt Hon Alan Howarth CBE, 
appointed a body to examine the position of the UK in the international trade in illicit 
antiquities, and to make recommendations. That body was the Ministerial Advisory 
Panel on Illicit Trade, colloquially known as ITAP (for “Illicit Trade Advisory 
Panel”). ITAP was placed under the chairmanship of Professor Normal Palmer, a 
Barrister and Professor of Commercial Law at University College London, and one of 
a very few legal experts on art and cultural heritage law practising in the UK.  
 
ITAP was geared toward trade interests from its inception. In addition to its chairman, 
ITAP had 8 members. Only two of these fell into our activist group: the Director of 
the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research (Lord Renfrew, on whom more 
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to follow), and the Director of the York Archaeological Trust. Three were 
unequivocally identifiable with trade interests: the Chairman of the British Art Market 
Federation, the Chairman of the Antiquities Dealers’ Association, and the Head of 
Antiquities and Associate Director at the auction house Bonhams and Brooks. The 
remaining three members consisted of two museum representatives and a journalist. 
They were the Director of the British Museum, the Deputy Director of the Museums 
Association, and the Editor of The Art Newspaper (Palmer et al. 2000). The interests 
represented by these three members are conflicting – their operations rely in many 
ways on the trade, but (as we have said in respect of museums, and as is also true for 
some of the newspaper’s copy) they display activist leanings also. On this basis we 
might with diffidence call them neutral interests. Activists would vehemently 
disagree, and consider them trade interests without doubt. On our view then, which 
perhaps overindulges a trade interest in suggesting an impartial panel, the 
trade/activist split on the panel was 4.5/3.5; on the activists’ very possibly more 
accurate reading the split was 6/2. Whichever view is right, the trade was generously 
represented.    
 
It is noteworthy that in addition to the heavy trade representation on ITAP, no 
specialist representative from one of the agencies of enforcement (i.e. police or 
customs) was invited to join. A panel with such a constitution does not appear well 
suited to produce robust and energetic trade regulation. What is less clear is how such 
an imbalance of power came about. The answer seems to be in part related to one 
aspect of government-regulatory doxa, and in part to the blunt capacity of powerful 
high-status individuals to cast themselves as community representatives and thrust 
themselves into the regulatory machinery. In respect of the first, there appears to be an 
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unreflective assumption on the part of government and those it charges to establish 
and run committee investigations such as ITAP that the natural place to start when 
one is investigating trade regulation is with the trade itself. The unavoidable bias this 
‘research’-based approach involves does not seem to have figured in government 
thinking in setting up the panel. Thus, from the beginning, the question to be 
answered was not ‘how should we (as outsiders, on behalf of society) regulate the 
trade’, but rather ‘what sort of regulation will the trade accept’? In respect of the 
second point – a blunt exercise of power – we have the extraordinary case of one of 
the trade members of the panel who reportedly ‘invited’ himself into membership. 
The backstory emerges that this person was stimulated to do so on hearing that one of 
the other members had been appointed, and considered themselves to be more central 
a market player. The fact that such self-invitations are possible at all is noteworthy, as 
is the ill-concealed egotism which attends status positions in the small world of 
antiquities.    
 
The antiquities market is not a new phenomenon, but legislative attention to its 
workings is. The harm caused at source by looters who steal objects in order to feed 
the demand in market nations for archaeologically significant artefacts has been well-
documented (e.g. Coggins 1969; Renfrew 1999; Brodie, Doole and Renfrew 2001; 
Mackenzie 2005b). Moral entrepreneurialism in relation to the destructive tendencies 
of the market in illicit antiquities began in earnest with the late 1960s and early 1970s 
writings of a crusading archaeologist (Coggins 1969, 1970, 1971) and the drafting of 
an international treaty which enshrined the principle of ‘the impoverishment of the 
cultural heritage of the countries of origin of [looted cultural] property’ (UNESCO 
1970). The recognition that the market was linked to destruction at source led to an 
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increasing interest by concerned moralists in the workings of the market: particularly 
the amount of information which it passed in its purchase mechanism (Meyer 1973; 
Burnham 1975; Bator 1983; Gill and Chippindale 1993; Elia 1993a, b, 1994; Renfrew 
1999; Chippindale and Gill 2000). This was quickly discovered to be close to none at 
all, raising the question how a market that did not know where any given object had 
come from could guard itself against the injection of illicit goods into its licit streams. 
In 1995 a second international convention, the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or 
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects concerned itself with the international issues of 
restitution and return (UNIDROIT 1995).  
 
When in the 1970s the UK came to consider accession to the UNESCO Convention it 
decided, wrongly, that it was unable or at least ill-advised to do so due to certain 
perceived conflicts between its domestic law and the Convention’s requirements. This 
decision is acknowledged to have been wrong both by contemporary regulatory 
insiders (data from regulatory interviewee) and by ITAP’s legal adviser who has 
written that when he investigated the matter on behalf of ITAP the conclusion was 
reached that the UK could accede to the convention without this necessitating 
amendment to its domestic law (Chamberlain 2002).     
 
Research into the antiquities trade has produced an image of the market as one in 
which licit and illicit flows of goods mix (Polk 2000; Alder and Polk 2002). Stolen 
goods are widely suspected to circulate in large numbers in this market, and indeed 
there have been high profile cases of seizure, followed sometimes by prosecution, 
where this suspicion has been shown to be correct (see Stead 1998). The lack of 
provenance accompanying objects entering the market’s channels enables dealers 
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either not to know about the illicit status of some of the objects they handle or if they 
do know to argue later, usually plausibly, that they didn’t. Many of the market 
interviewees in a study by one of the authors had no ideological or practical objection 
to dealing in looted goods (Mackenzie 2005b). Such goods were not perceived to have 
been ‘stolen’ in the strict sense of the word, but rather were thought to be the subject 
of unduly retentive source country laws which could be ignored without action 
incurring the taint of immorality, or ‘real’ illegality. Looted antiquities are seen by 
these market traders as ‘saved’ from obscurity or possible destruction by their 
‘discovery’ and on-sale. These market traders also make considerable profits from 
their businesses, enabling them to maintain stylish premises in expensive locations.   
 
This being the case, we might reasonably expect that the trade representatives on 
ITAP would be little disposed to agreeing measures to control the import into the UK 
and sale of looted cultural material. By according them such central place in the 
regulatory process, the government ensured that a trade-friendly output would 
emerge. And so it did, in the form of the 2003 Act.    
 
ITAP met twelve times before publishing on 18 December a document which detailed 
its ‘findings’ and recommendations (Palmer et al. 2000). From the first meeting it was 
apparent that the trade interests on the panel would not allow any recommendation to 
enter the final report which prejudiced their financial interests. As a result Professor 
Palmer’s role quickly became one of ‘peacemaker’ (personal communication, 
confidential interviewee): it was his responsibility to produce at the conclusion of the 
panel’s investigation and deliberation a report that framed a solution to the issue. At 
an early stage it became clear that without some conciliatory tactics from Palmer, 
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such were the polarised interests and views of the members that the panel would be 
proved constitutionally incapable of reaching any sort of consensus. 
 
Conciliatory tactics were Palmer’s strong point, and he was determined not to let the 
panel fail in its remit. Conciliation does not overcome disparities of power, however: 
where concessions must be made they are often made disproportionately. So it was 
with ITAP: the activists could not win. The two international treaties mentioned 
above (UNESCO 1970; UNIDROIT 1995) stood out as the obvious candidates in 
terms of which to frame the UK’s response to the problem at hand, and ITAP’s 
inquiry was based around establishing the suitability of recommending the UK’s 
accession to either or both of these Conventions. Our interviews reveal that it was 
hoped by Professor Palmer as well as by the activists on the panel and some observers 
of the panel’s work that it might be feasible to recommend the UK’s accession to both 
Conventions. This hope would prove misplaced. 
 
The panel correctly identified that the UNIDROIT Convention was more onerous in 
the obligations it placed on those who deal in antiquities than was the UNESCO 
Convention. The clash of interests on the panel meant that its ultimate decision would 
depend upon the resolution of a power conflict rather than upon an impartial and 
thorough investigation of the illicit market, the control mechanisms in the 
Conventions, their fit with UK law, and the prospects of them going some way 
towards solving the problem of stolen goods in the market. The power ratio and the 
vested interests of the trade representatives in continuing to deal in stolen goods 
transformed what was presented as an official move to consider and respond to the 
illicit trade into a negotiation over how much regulation the trade would acquiesce to 
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(ITAP 2001). The trade representatives agreed to a ‘compromise’ solution whereby 
they would endorse a recommendation to accede to the UNESCO Convention along 
with a package of attendant measures – which would include the 2003 Act – if the 
UNIDROIT Convention was dropped from the agenda. By way of this second 
dimensional Lukesian strategy of agenda setting, in which the trade interests made 
clear what was open for discussion and what was not, they manoeuvred Palmer and 
the activists into accepting the measure with the least teeth as an alternative to having 
nothing to show for the exercise. We emerge with a ‘better than nothing’ approach to 
regulation that characterises minor concessions by business as a regulatory success – a 
success that is as much as can be expected in the circumstances.  
 
Following the publication of the ITAP report on 18 December 2000, two of its 
recommendations were realised. First, the UK achieved full accession to the 
UNESCO Convention on 31 October 2002. Second, the Dealing in Cultural Objects 
(Offences) Act, a piece of legislation with a single operative criminal provision 
representing the offence proposed by ITAP, was introduced into the House of 
Commons as a Private Member’s Bill by Richard Allen MP, receiving its Second 
Reading on 4 April 2003, gaining Royal Assent on 30 October 2003, and taking effect 
on 30 December 2003. 
    
 
The progress of the criminal offence from recommendation to enactment 
 
Several of ITAP’s recommendations have not come to fruition, and indeed the 
proposed criminal offence might have gone no further than a proposition in its report 
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had it not been for the confluence of several factors. First, at the same time as ITAP 
was pursuing its formal deliberations, an informal ‘All Party Archaeology Group’ was 
set up under the chairmanship of Lord Renfrew to bring together MPs and members 
of the House of Lords interested in archaeological issues. Second, since Renfrew was 
also a member of ITAP, he provided a bridge between these two bodies and 
introduced the All Party Archaeology Group to the issues with which ITAP were 
grappling. And third, a member of this group, Richard Allen MP, entered the Private 
Member’s Bill ballot and came out in seventeenth place. We interviewed Allen in 
order to get first-hand data on the process of law-making in respect of the 2003 Act, 
and report here some of the particularly illuminating elements of that process. Where 
it is helpful we use Allen’s own words, and unattributed quotes hereafter belong to 
him.   
 
The Private Member’s Bill ballot is, in effect, a legislation lottery. Historically, every 
MP who is not a government member has the right to apply to propose one piece of 
legislation. Given the pressure on parliamentary time, in practice this right has been 
whittled down over the years, and now the 200-300 annual applications are subject to 
a process of random ranking, where the top twenty are deemed to be worth 
proceeding with, in order of numerical ranking. Thus the further down the top twenty 
one’s name appears, the less likely there will be sufficient parliamentary time to see a 
Bill through. At a ranking of seventeen Allen found himself near the back of the 
queue and with ‘a lot of behind-the-scenes things to do’ in order to maximise the 
chances of his Bill’s success by minimising the chances of its being derailed and 
running out of time. Party political consensus for these lower-ranking Private 
Member’s Bills becomes significantly more important as ‘if any member at any time 
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wants to be awkward and try and block something its pretty easy to do that’ (see also 
Garner 2004: 211). 
 
Suddenly given the opportunity to propose a piece of legislation, through his 
connection with the All Party Archaeology Group Allen selected the ITAP offence as 
the basis of his Bill in the event he were to be allocated parliamentary time. The 
backing of the group gave him wider support than the average Private Member’s Bill 
would enjoy, and by the time the Bill became the subject of firm agreement he had 
support from a broad cross-section of members of both Houses, and indeed from the 
government.  
 
The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) agreed to draft the Bill for 
Allen. Here was opportunity to draw upon the Department’s legal and cultural 
heritage expertise, particularly in the form of David Gaimster, who had been seconded 
to the DCMS from the British Museum to help deal with the issues surrounding illicit 
antiquities which ITAP had exposed. Gaimster had worked with Roger Bland 
(secretary to ITAP) at the British Museum. Thus it was that the drafters and main 
supporters of the Bill – Gaimster and the DCMS, Allen and Renfrew – were linked 
through the network of contacts constituted by ITAP to those in the antiquities market 
who were to be regulated, represented particularly by two prominent dealers who sat 
on ITAP, James Ede and Anthony Browne. 
  
Allen describes matters thus: 
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[S]o there are lots of people who know each other and are all being helpful on 
the archaeology side and they were having quite helpful dialogue with the 
dealer side, which is James Ede and Anthony Browne, because ITAP brought 
them together. So, politically what this meant is that although there were some 
quite difficult negotiations in getting to a Bill that was acceptable to both 
sides, it meant that it wasn’t coming from the archaeologists and therefore you 
didn’t have the dealers wound up to try and block it, which would have been 
one of the possible dangers, in that it was coming from a consensus of all 
sides. 
 
Allen’s view of his remit was therefore to ‘get a bill that was acceptable to both sides’ 
and he describes the outcome as ‘coming from a consensus of all sides’. This is very 
much the regulation by compromise, influence and negotiation referred to above in 
the example of the asbestos industry in which the subject industry plays a key role in 
its own regulatory design. 
 
Once the bill was tabled Allen received visits from dealers, and their lawyers. He 
describes his role in these meetings as mediating between the dealers and the DCMS 
lawyers who drafted the legislation. The dealers would propose amendments, and he 
would relay these to the DCMS to see if they could be accepted. Like Norman 
Palmer’s role in ITAP Allen’s ‘was a political job: to try to make sure we did all stay 
together… to try to make sure we had agreement all the way through’. Although the 
negotiations could properly be characterised at this point as political discussion over 
the question of ‘how much’ regulation, they took the form of legal discussion over 
‘what might be wrong’ with the Bill. As with the US automobile industry, substantive 
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questions of regulation thus became formal questions of law, as the trade lobby 
endeavoured to find ‘difficulties’ in the legislation as drafted and through the 
identification of these difficulties negotiate the replacement of those operative 
provisions of the Bill which had some bite with provisions considerably less harmful 
to the trade. The success of the translation of group interests into legal theory is 
reflected in the comments of Richard Allen after the event. The dealers, he says, were 
‘extraordinarily helpful’.  
 
The Bill encountered the standard opposition levelled at Private Member’s Bills by an 
obstructive core of Conservative MPs who tend to oppose all such proposals on the 
broad platform that the UK needs less, not more, laws, and also from those who do 
what they can to wreck legislation seen as government Bills in disguise. The main 
tactic here in respect of Private Member’s Bills is to ‘talk them out’ by instrumentally 
extending the debate on preceding items so that the Bill simply runs out of time on the 
day and needs to be re-scheduled. Given the pressure on Parliamentary time, this does 
not have to happen more than a very few times before the Bill has to be dropped 
altogether. Renfrew was ‘absolutely critical’ at this stage, lambasting his fellow 
Tories for their employment of such tactics in respect of what he perceived to be so 
worthy a cause, and as a result again of this one man’s activism, the Bill got its time. 
In the process of debate, however, other parliamentary voices, clearly representative 
of the market, played a role in ameliorating any ‘criminal’ sting the Bill might 
acquire. Two of the Lords active in the antiquities market – Lord Brooke of Sutton 
Mandeville (President of the British Antique Dealers Association and president of the 
British Art Market Federation) and Lord Stewartby (a coin collector for 60 years and 
former Chair of the Treasure Trove Reviewing Committee) - while claiming to 
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support the broad purpose of the Bill were driven primarily by market interests; ‘… it 
is vital,’ Lord Brooke argued, ‘that we maintain a balanced and reasonable regulatory 
environment here if we are to prevent this thriving market from disappearing abroad.’ 
(Lord Brooke, Hansard: 12 Sept 2003, Column 543).  
 
During the Bill’s passage through the Reading stages, the US and its ‘coalition of the 
willing’ invaded Iraq, prompting the widely-reported looting of the Baghdad museum 
(Gumbel and Keys 2003; Bogdanos 2005). The criminal offence contained in the Bill 
had of course been in the pipeline for over two years at this point, while the Bill itself 
had been in process for many months. Although its operative provisions were 
applicable to museum theft it was only peripherally concerned with this type of crime, 
having been designed in the main to combat archaeological destruction. Still, as the 
Baghdad museum became front-page news around the world the government stepped 
up its support for the Bill and Tessa Jowell, then Minister for the Arts, began publicly 
to tout the Bill as a government response to the matter (e.g. Hansard: 7 May 2003, 
Column 128W). 
 
Whereas prior to this point, government support for the Bill had been subject to ‘some 
delicacy’, after the Bagdhad museum looting Allen found he had a stronger hand in 
his negotiations with the dealers, government support for his Bill now being ‘public 
and explicit’. Even so, once the dealers had commissioned counsel to ‘go through the 
bill with a fine tooth comb’ and had begun proposing amendments, all but ‘one or 
two’ of these amendments were accepted by Allen and the DCMS. Even with 
government support, the capricious path of a low-ranking Private Member’s Bill is 
such that the spectre of possible disruption is ever-present. Had the ‘working 
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relationship between dealers and archaeologists’ that ITAP represented not been in 
place, the dealers ‘might have been winding MPs up to propose amendments in a 
hostile fashion, which would have effectively wrecked the bill’. This threat of 
unsettling the delicate balance on which the successful high-wire act of such a Bill 
depends underwrote the climate in which the Bill’s terms were formed, necessitating 
the creation of a context of collaboration rather than control. In this context ‘the 
dealers… were very helpful and cooperative’ and Allen described his role in getting 
the Bill through ‘as making sure we kept it cooperative and didn’t allow it to become 
a “bashing the dealer” Bill’. 
 
Trade members and their legal representatives have therefore been influential at all 
stages in the legislative process: from the inception of the Bill in the ITAP proposal, 
which represented agreement on ‘a general principle’, although not on the detail of the 
legislation; through its drafting where influence was maintained on that very detail; to 
its ultimate final form and beyond. The influence of the market is nowhere more 
explicit than in the DCMS guidance documents which have been distributed to dealers 
to assist them in interpreting the meaning of the Act and its potential impact on the 
trade: 
 
The Act does not necessarily oblige dealers to take steps to ascertain 
provenance or to exercise due diligence to avoid committing the offence. 
Knowledge or belief and dishonesty must be proved by the prosecution…  
Any increase in costs to legitimate business, therefore, is likely to be minimal 
(Home Office Department for Culture Media and Sport 2004: 1). 
 
 23
Discussion: power, politics and performative regulation 
 
The case of the 2003 Act provides an opportunity to suggest some directions towards 
updating the classic literature on the sociology of law to reflect contemporary 
political-legislative trends. If theories of regulation can in rough fashion be split 
between ‘public interest’ and ‘private interest’ theories (Tomasic 1985; Morgan and 
Yeung 2007), where the former see regulation as a consensus-modeled attempt to 
attend to the common good and the latter see it as a conflict-modeled contest of 
particular interest groups, our data firmly support the latter framework. We have 
attended above to some mapping out of the particular form the various interests 
involved in the process we have studied have taken, and we will conclude here by 
exploring some of the theoretical implications for conflict models of society 
generally, and private interest theories of regulation in particular.     
 
Three decades ago, Carson suggested that laws which appeared in theory inimical to 
powerful interests were in practice often either not enforced, or indeed designed to be 
ineffective (Carson 1974). The 2003 Act seems to live up to both of these standards. It 
has not yet been enforced, and our study maps the process of the exertion of influence 
by the trade in contributing to the design of its ineffective central provision. Within 
this broad-brush statement of legislation ‘designed to be ineffective’ however, we can 
uncover in the history of the 2003 Act several contextual forces which contribute to 
this process of design. 
 
Perhaps most obviously, the precarious nature of a Private Member’s Bill played a 
major role in the dilution of the control which was to emerge. In respect of this 
legislative process, where ‘the key thing is not to get bogged down’, where the 
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‘atmosphere’ at the reading stages has to be ‘correct’ for the Bill to progress, and 
something as apparently innocuous as ‘proposing amendments’ can be sufficient to 
‘wreck’ a bill by ‘talking it out’, the scene is set for weak regulation characterised by 
‘compromise’ (these, again, are all Richard Allen’s words).  
 
Compromise was also evident prior to the legislative stage, both explicitly (in terms of 
the perceived remit of ITAP) and less obviously. To capture the latter we invoke 
Lukes’ conception of three-dimensional power, which in its third dimension achieves 
through the promulgation of ideology what it might otherwise only secure by more 
blunt mechanisms. It is clear that the value placed by ‘regulators’ on market interests - 
even a market as elite and arcane as the antiquities market - is high. In the course of 
attempting to introduce legislation designed to protect archaeological and historical 
knowledge, market interests have been protected through both the consultative and 
legislative processes. The insinuation of trade interests in the consultative stages of 
the Bill, through representation on ITAP, was openly solicited by those charged with 
designing a regulatory framework to address dealing in looted antiquities.  
 
The language of explicit compromise used by many of our key informants provides 
considerable support for Chambliss’s ‘dialectical perspective’ of lawmaking, which 
sees law as attempting to resolve pressing conflicts that emerge in society (Chambliss 
and Seidman 1982). Through our data we see this dialectical process as situated in a 
‘structuralist’ view of law which in the critical literature has traditionally been 
expressed in a view of regulation as an instrument of a state concerned primarily with 
maintaining social stability, particularly in terms of the long-term survival of the 
extant socio-economic system, and often at the immediate expense of the less 
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powerful (Collins 1984; Lynch, Michalowski and Groves 2000). Effective trade 
regulation is seen in this model as a subordination by the state of ‘the immediate 
interests of particular businesses to the long-term interests of capital as a whole’ 
(Whyte 2004: 144). 
 
While there may be much to commend this view, it tends to such a level of 
functionalist abstraction that it skates over the political micro-processes we have 
examined above. Attribution of a self-preservation desire to ‘the state’, or its concern 
with the long-term interests of ‘capital’ does not give enough attention to the political 
party process, and to individual political careerist interests as one important group of 
interests in the model of social and regulatory ‘conflict’.  
 
Our study suggests that any analysis of the dialectical process of lawmaking in 
contemporary society requires an exploration of this micro-level of individual desire 
which drives a political concern with resolving social conflict. It may be quite 
accurate to say that this ultimately gives rise to macro-social historical patterns of 
concern with the longevity of extant institutional structures, as well as in a state’s 
apparent concern to self-preservation which creates regulatory controls over business 
as a product of attending to state or system legitimacy in the eyes of non-corporate 
public interests. Within this theoretical position, however, we find a meso level of 
analysis consisting of cultures of political practice and organisational and professional 
norms. Still further ‘down’, we reach the micro level where we collected our data. 
Here, grand impressions of system maintenance are transformed into individual 
political decisions and the personal pursuit of self-interest. 
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At this level, the particular dialectical pressure manifested by a drive to conflict 
resolution appears considerably more short-termist than a substantive concern with 
system longevity. It is simply a matter of longevity of political office, and thus 
manifests in a desire to ‘keep a lid’ on social conflict until the current political cycle 
runs its course. Bluntly, there is no suggestion in any of our data from the main 
players in this particular regulatory debate that the government had any serious desire 
to staunch the flow of illicit antiquities into England and Wales. What individual 
ministers emerge from our data as desiring is the impression during their time in 
office of movement in the level of control of the trade rather than actual control: 
enough committee discussion and legislative paper-shuffling to repel accusations of 
cultural insensitivity or passive acquiescence in a criminal market. Alan Howarth, 
under public pressure from Lord Renfrew, our leading activist, set up the committee 
infrastructure within which a compromise solution could be thrashed out between 
trade and activist interests. Tessa Jowell eagerly ‘adopted’ the emerging legislation 
when it suited her publicity mandate, the government having previously abandoned 
the fate of ITAP’s legislative recommendations to the lottery of Private Members’ 
interests. This is what we mean by ‘regulation as performativity’.        
 
There are (at least) two meanings of performativity we are working with here: one is 
the relatively straightforward critical suggestion that an act, in our case political 
regulation, is primarily about performance rather than about substance, and is in this 
sense fake or superficial. The second meaning is more technical: this is the 
suggestion, most evident in Judith Butler’s Foucauldian use of the term (e.g. 1997), 
that performative acts are constitutive, insofar as discourse has the power to create 
objects. We certainly adhere to the first sense of performativity in our suggestion that 
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regulation satisfies performative functions in contemporary political debate. In order 
to examine how far we agree with the performativity of regulation in the second 
sense, we need to ask what objects it is that are so created?  
 
One answer ties the second meaning into the first: the object created here is the 
appearance of social consensus. Performative regulation as a dialectical response to 
social contradictions such as the current value dispute causing conflict between trade 
and activist interests in the antiquities market does not attempt to resolve 
substantively the matter in conflict. Rather than concerning itself with the substance 
of the conflict it focuses on the people in whom the conflict appears to be manifested. 
We can say ‘appears to be’ as the issue of the destruction of cultural heritage is one in 
which there is a great silent majority public interest, although the issue only engages 
the active campaigning of a relatively small archaeological constituency. The question 
for the performative regulator is therefore not ‘how can we solve this social problem’, 
but ‘how can we suppress the explicit dissensus that this social problem has brought 
into public view’? This is not problem-solving, then, but ‘people-solving’; it has 
become quite common in business to ask ‘how do I make this problem go away?’ and 
this ambiguous approach to conflict resolution seems close to our observation of 
performative regulation in the present case study.    
 
The more profound answer, however, ties the second meaning of performative 
regulation into the theory of regulation as facilitative for powerful constituencies. 
Here, the object created is a regulatory structure which sets the running, as it were, for 
future debates around control. In the dialectical model of law-making, where 
compromise is written into the rationale for the creation of legal instruments, and 
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power imbalances offer differential access to the means of framing those instruments, 
regulation plays the performative function of allowing linguistically adept legal and 
policy sophistry in argumentation by interest groups and their legal and political 
representatives to influence the conceptual policy terrain on which battles to resolve 
conflict are fought. The dealers’ support for the legislation was strategic, a response to 
an emerging crisis in which the market faced the prospect of increased regulation, and 
which presented them with the opportunity to be involved in the process of their own 
regulation in order to neutralise the possibility of alternative, more hostile regulation. 
 
The object created in this process is regulation which allows government to satisfy its 
performative desire in the first sense of the term, and delivers a legal structure that 
allows those ‘regulated’ to continue to do precisely what they were doing in the first 
place. The creation of this legal structure that outlaws certain forms of behaviour, at 
the same time creates a zone of legitimate behaviour outside its boundaries – a 
structural performativity in the second sense which serves to legitimate all 
transactions in looted antiquities in the UK that cannot be proven to satisfy the 
requirements of the offence. As we have said, so far this is all of them. The 
performative process of becoming subject to a criminal law has been rather a pleasant 
one for dealers in looted antiquities.  
 
 
References 
 
 
ALDER, C. and POLK, K. (2002), 'Stopping this Awful Business: the Illicit Traffic in 
Antiquities Examined as a Criminal Market', Art Antiquity and Law, 7: 35. 
BATOR, P.M. (1983), The International Trade in Art. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
BECKER, H.S. (1963), Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: 
Free Press. 
 29
BOGDANOS, M. (2005), 'The Casualties of War: the Truth about the Iraq Museum', 
American Journal of Archaeology, 109/3: 477-526. 
BOURDIEU, P. (1988), Homo Academicus, tr. P. Collier. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
BRAITHWAITE, J. (1995), 'Inequality and Republican Criminology', in J. Hagan and 
R.D. Peterson, eds., Crime and Inequality. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
BRODIE, N., DOOLE, J. and RENFREW, C., eds., (2001), Trade in Illicit Antiquities: the 
Destruction of the World's Archaeological Heritage. Cambridge: McDonald 
Institute for Archaeological Research. 
BURNHAM, B. (1975), The Art Crisis. London: Collins. 
BUTLER, J. (1997), Excitable Speech: a Politics of the Performative. New York: 
Routledge. 
CAIN, M. and HUNT, A. (1979), Marx and Engels on Law. London: Academic Press. 
CALHOUN, C. and HILLER, H. (1988), 'Asbesdos Exposure by Johns-Manville: Cover-
ups, Litigation, Bankruptcy and Compensation', Social Problems, 35: 162-81. 
CARSON, W.G. (1974), 'The Sociology of Crime and the Emergence of Criminal 
Laws', in P. Rock and M. McIntosh, eds., Deviance and Social Control. 
London: Tavistock. 
CHAMBERLAIN, K. (2002), 'UK Accession to the 1970 UNESCO Convention', Art 
Antiquity and Law, 7/3: 231-52. 
CHAMBLISS, W.J. and SEIDMAN, R.B. (1982), Law, Order and Power. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley. 
CHIPPINDALE, C. and GILL, D.J.W. (2000), 'Material Consequences of Contemporary 
Classical Collecting', American Journal of Archaeology, 104: 463-511. 
COGGINS, C. (1969), 'Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities', Art Journal, Fall: 
94-8. 
COGGINS, C. (1970), 'The Maya Scandal: How Thieves Strip Sites of Past Cultures', 
Smithsonian, October: 8-16. 
COGGINS, C. (1971), 'An Art Historian Speaks Out', Auction, January: 33. 
COLLINS, H. (1984), Marxism and Law. New York: Oxford University Press. 
ELIA, R.J. (1993a), 'A Review of Colin Renfrew's The Cycladic Spirit: Masterpieces 
from the Nicholas P Goulandris Collection (Abrams, New York, 1991)', 
Archaeology, January/February: 64. 
ELIA, R.J. (1993b), 'Ricardo Elia Responds', Archaeology, 46/3: 17. 
ELIA, R.J. (1994), 'The World Cannot Afford Many More Collectors with a Passion 
for Antiquities', The Art Newspaper, 41/October: 19. 
GARNER, R. (2004), Animals, Politics and Morality. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
GILL, D.J.W. and CHIPPINDALE, C. (1993), 'Material and Intellectual Consequences of 
Esteem for Cycladic Figures', American Journal of Archaeology, 97/3: 602-
73. 
GUMBEL, A. and KEYS, D. (2003), 'US Protected Oil Ministry While Looters 
Destroyed Museum', The Independent, 14 April (London). 
HOME OFFICE DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURE MEDIA AND SPORT (2004), 'Dealing in 
Tainted Cultural Objects - Guidance on the Dealing in Cultural Objects 
(Offences) Act 2003', DCMS Cultural Property Unit Publication PP639. 
London: DCMS. 
ITAP (2001), Illicit Trade Advisory Panel Minutes of Meetings June 2000 - October 
2001. Unpublished: DCMS. 
 30
KERSEL, M.M. (2006), 'From the Ground to the Buyer: a Market Analysis of the Trade 
in Illegal Antiquities', in N. Brodie, M.M. Kersel, C. Luke and K. Walker 
Tubb, eds., Archaeology, Cultural Heritage and the Antiquities Trade. 
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. 
LATOUR, B. and WOOLGAR, S. (1979), Laboratory Life: the Construction of Scientific 
Facts. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
LEE, M.T. (1998), 'The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of Auto Safety 
Regulations, 1893-1978', Business and Economic History, 27/Winter: 2. 
LUKES, S. (2005), Power: a Radical View, 2nd edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
LYNCH, M.J., MICHALOWSKI, R.J. and GROVES, W.B. (2000), The New Primer in 
Radical Criminology: Critical Perspectives on Crime, Power and Identity, 3rd 
edn. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
MACKENZIE, S.R.M. (2005a), 'Dig a Bit Deeper: Law, Regulation and the Illicit 
Antiquities Market', British Journal of Criminology, 45: 249-68. 
MACKENZIE, S.R.M. (2005b), Going, Going, Gone: Regulating the Market in Illicit 
Antiquities. Leicester: Institute of Art and Law. 
MACKENZIE, S.R.M. (2006), 'Psychosocial Balance Sheets: Illicit Purchase Decisions 
in the Antiquities Market', Current Issues in Criminal Justice, 18/2. 
MACKENZIE, S.R.M. and GREEN, P.J. (forthcoming), 'The Antiquities Market and 
'Crimes of the Powerful': What Kind of Power?' 
MCBARNET, D. (1992), 'Legitimate Rackets: Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, and the 
Boundaries of Legality', The Journal of Human Justice, 3: 56-74. 
MCBARNET, D. (2003), 'When Compliance is Not the Solution but the Problem: from 
Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude', in V. Braithwaite, ed., Taxing 
Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
MCBARNET, D. (2006), 'After Enron will 'Whiter than White Collar Crime' Still 
Wash?' British Journal of Criminology, 46/6: 1091-109. 
MEYER, K. (1973), The Plundered Past: the Traffic in Art Treasures. New York: 
Atheneum. 
MORGAN, B. and YEUNG, K. (2007), An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Texts 
and Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
PALMER, N., ADDYMAN, P., ANDERSON, R., BROWNE, A., SOMERS COCKS, A., DAVIES, 
M., EDE, J., VAN DER LANDE, J. and RENFREW, C. (2000), 'Ministerial 
Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade', December 2000. London: Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport. 
PASSAS, N. (2005), 'Lawful But Awful: "Legal Corporate Crimes"', The Journal of 
Socio-economics, 34: 771-86. 
PASSAS, N. and GOODWIN, N.R., eds., (2004), It's Legal but it Ain't Right: Harmful 
Social Consequences of Legal Industries. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
POLK, K. (2000), 'The Antiquities Trade Viewed as a Criminal Market', Hong Kong 
Lawyer, September: 82. 
RENFREW, C. (1999), Loot, Legitimacy and Ownership: the Ethical Crisis in 
Archaeology. Amsterdam: Joh. Enschede. 
STEAD, I.M. (1998), The Salisbury Hoard. Gloucestershire: Tempus. 
TAMANAHA, B.Z. (2006), Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
TOMASIC, R. (1985), 'Law-making and Social Change', Current Sociology, 33: 99-
129. 
 31
UNESCO (1970), Convention on the Means of Prohibiting  and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.  
UNIDROIT (1995), Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.  
WHYTE, D. (2004), 'Regulation and Corporate Crime', in J. Muncie and D. Wilson, 
eds., Student Handbook of Criminal Justice and Criminology. London: 
Cavendish. 
 
